Online Appendix

"Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure"

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A. Supplemental Figures and Tables

Figure S1: Nielsen Rating for Cable TV News Networks, by Race of Household Head, 2004 to 2016

a. Households Headed by Non-Hispanic Whites



b. Households Headed by Hispanics, Non-Whites



Notes: Nielsen ratings indicate the fraction of all TV-owning households that are tuned to a particular program at a particular time. Figure plots average ratings for the 5pm to 11pm time-slot, Monday through Friday, during the month of November for years 2004 through 2016. Sample size for each November estimate ranges from 99,000 to 119,000 households. Panels A and B present estimates for Nielsen households split according to the race and ethnicity of the household head.

Figure S2: Polarization in Campaign Finance Scores by Type of Campaign Donor



Notes: Calculations based on Data Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections database (DIME; Bonica, 2013). Donor ideology is divided into ideology terciles based on campaign contributions in 2002 ranked by dollar-weighted CF scores. Liberal, moderate and conservative donors have CF scores that respectively fall into the first, second and third tercile of the CF score distribution. The height of each bar in each reported year reflects the share of all contributions (in dollars) falling within each 2002 ideology tercile by donor types, which are individuals, corporations, and non-corporate organizations in panels A, B, and C respectively.

Figure S3: County-District Cells for the 12th Congressional District of North Carolina for the 111th Congress.



Notes: Figure depicts the geography of North Carolina Congressional District 12, which crosses three Commuting Zones as defined for the 111th Congress.

Figure S4: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, November 2004 to November 2008/2012/2016. Dependent Variables: Nielsen TV Rating or Nielsen Market Share (in % pts)



Notes: Figure reports estimates of equation (4) for the relationship between changes in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and 100× changes in the news TV market share of indicated news channels across designated periods. All ratings are measured in November of a presidential election year. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 6 of Table 2. Observations are weighted by Nielsen's estimate of the number of TV households in each cell, and standard errors are clustered on CZs. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S7.

Figure S5: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2010. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability (in % pts)

a. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



b. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



Notes: Estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between the change in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and (panel A) the change in the probability that a Republican is elected, and (panel B) the change in the Republican two-party vote share, both measured in percentage points. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S13.

Table S1: Questions Comprising the Ten Item Pew Ideological Consistency Scale

	Conservative Position (1)	*Liberal Position* (2)
1	Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good	Government often does a better job than people give it credit for
2	Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient	Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest
3	Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return	Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live decently
4	The government can't afford to do much more to help the needy	The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt
5	Blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition	Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get ahead these days
6	Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care	Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents
7	Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit	Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace
8	Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy	Business corporations make too much profit
9	The best way to ensure peace is through military strength	Stricter environmental laws and reulations are worth the cost
10	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society	Homosexuality should be accepted by society

Notes: Pew Ideological Consistency Scale, administered 1994 though present. Individual questions were recoded as "-1" for a liberal response, "+1" for a conservative response, "0" for other (don't know/refused/volunteered) responses. Scores on the full scale range from -10 (liberal responses to all 10 questions) to +10 (conservative responses to all 10 questions). Documentation available at http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/appendix-a-the-ideological-consistency-scale/ (accessed 11/23/2017)

Table S2: Summary Statistics for Changes in Commuting Zone-Level Exposure to Chinese Imports between 2002 – 2010 and 2000 – 2008

	2002-2010	2000-2008
	(1)	(2)
Mean	0.71	0.90
25th Percentile	0.40	0.53
75th Percentile	0.90	1.11
P75 - P25	0.49	0.58

Notes: The change in exposure to Chinese imports is calculated as per equation (1). For each CZ, it is equal to the sum of the change in Chinese import absorption in each U.S. industry in the relevant time interval multiplied by that industry's start-of-period (lagged by ten-years) share of CZ employment. The 2002-2010 import shock in column 1 is used for the main analysis, and weights commuting zones by their adult voting-age population in 2000. The 2000-2008 import shock in column 2 is used for the analysis of presidential elections since 2000, and weights commuting zones by their number of votes in the 2000 presidential election.

Table S3: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and FOX Cable TV News Ratings, November 2004 to November 2008/2012/2016. Dependent Variable: Nielsen Market Share for FOX News by Age-Race Groups (in % pts)

	2004-2008	2004-2012	2004-2016
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Market Share Fox News		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	13.16	12.45	12.35
[t>2007] x N-H White 18-34	(5.88)	(6.90)	(5.79)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	7.33	12.93	13.49
[t>2007] x N-H White 35-54	(5.25)	(6.34)	(4.98)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	10.77	11.41	12.57
[t>2007] x N-H White 55+	(4.67)	(5.42)	(4.47)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	10.93	15.32	4.37
[t>2007] x Other Group 18-34	(6.49)	(8.70)	(6.54)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	6.60	7.76	7.32
[t>2007] x Other Group 35-54	(5.19)	(6.38)	(4.44)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	1.78	-0.75	3.27
[t>2007] x Other Group 55+	(4.76)	(5.66)	(5.66)

Notes: $N = 5,110$, $5,079$, $5,037$ in columns 1, 2, and 3. In November 2004, the combined Nielsen rating of FOX News, CNN and MSNBC was 0.9/2.0/4.9 for young/middle-aged/older non-Hispanic whites, and 0.5/0.9/2.1 for young/middle-aged/older Hispanics and non-whites. The market share of FOX News was 63/66/61 and 49/44/37 percent in the six groups. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 6 of Table 2.

Table S4: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, 2004 to 2012 (February/May/June/November). Dependent Variables: Change in Cable TV Rating or Cable TV News Market Share (in % pts).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			A. Combined Nielsen Rating of TV News Networks			
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-0.13	-0.09	0.20	0.14	0.04	-0.06
[t=2012]	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)
			B. Market Share FOX News			
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	3.05	4.18	4.69	6.45	7.80	10.06
[t=2012]	(1.31)	(2.46)	(4.05)	(3.89)	(4.42)	(4.35)
			C. Market Share CNN			
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-1.51	-0.40	0.31	0.73	0.17	-0.09
[t=2012]	(0.94)	(1.78)	(3.85)	(3.94)	(4.49)	(4.42)
			D. Market Share MSNBC			
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-1.54	-3.78	-5.00	-7.19	-7.96	-9.97
[t=2012]	(1.00)	(1.52)	(2.85)	(2.82)	(2.78)	(3.06)
Estimation Method	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage		49.3	44.0	41.3	30.4	30.5
CZ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Age-Race Group FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
CZ Industry/Occ x [t=2012]			yes	yes	yes	yes
Pres. Election Ctrls x [t=2012]				yes	yes	yes
Census Divisions x [t=2012]					yes	yes
Age-Race Group FE x [t=2012]						yes

N=27,921 CZ-year-age-race cells in Panel A and N=19,223 cells in Panels B-D. The Combined Nielsen Rating in Panel A indicates the percentage of households that own TVs that were watching one of the three major TV news networks. Panels B-D indicate the market share of each major TV news network in their combined market. Data in each year cover the four months during which Nielsen conducts ratings sweeps (February, May, July, November). In 2004, the average combined rating was 2.4%, and the TV news market shares were 53.3% for FOX News, 31.9% for CNN, and 14.8% for MSNBC. Control variables are defined as in Table 2. Observations are weighted by Nielsen's estimate of the number of TV households in each cell, and standard errors are clustered on CZs.

Table S5: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2010 and 2002-2016. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability and Change in Republican Two-Party Vote Share (in % pts)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	A. Change in Republican Win Probability 2002-2010				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	5.48	14.53	23.89	24.59	24.08
	(5.30)	(11.56)	(11.63)	(11.88)	(12.07)
	B. Change in Republican Win Probability 2002-2016				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	6.47	18.78	27.75	28.06	27.07
	(5.43)	(11.72)	(12.02)	(12.10)	(12.37)
	C. Change in Republican Vote Share 2002-2010				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-0.40	1.34	-0.83	-0.54	-1.08
	(2.30)	(5.52)	(5.83)	(5.82)	(5.98)
	D. Change in Republican Vote Share 2002-2016				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	0.94	-4.58	-7.84	-5.60	-6.39
	(2.68)	(6.09)	(6.93)	(6.17)	(6.31)
Estimation Method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage	35.8	37.0	27.3	29.1	29.2
2000 Industry/Occ Controls		yes	yes	yes	yes
Census Division Dummies			yes	yes	yes
2000 Demographic Controls				yes	yes
1996/2000 Pres. Election Ctrls					yes

Notes: N=3,772 county-district cells. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in Table 3: Industry and occupation controls in column 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations. Census division dummies in column 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demographic controls in column 4 comprise the percentage of a county's population in nine age and four racial groups, as well as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. Election controls in column 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, measured at the county level. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts.

Table S6: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2010 and 2002-2016. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

	A. 2002 - 2010				B. 2002 - 2016			
	Liberal Dems	Moderate Dems	Moderate Repubs	Conserv Repubs	Liberal Dems	Moderate Dems	Moderate Repubs	Conserv Repubs
(1) Base Specification	0.05	-5.54	2.95	2.53	4.82	-10.62	0.66	5.27
	(3.75)	(5.83)	(5.73)	(6.55)	(5.81)	(6.86)	(6.20)	(6.95)
(2) + 2000 Ind/Occ	-0.49	-14.05	-2.55	17.03	7.86	-24.89	2.37	15.32
Controls	(8.18)	(14.44)	(11.87)	(14.58)	(10.76)	(16.28)	(13.30)	(15.24)
(3) + Census Division	-5.44	-18.46	-4.12	28.02	4.19	-30.85	0.29	25.71
Dummies	(8.72)	(13.93)	(11.94)	(15.55)	(11.45)	(16.59)	(12.42)	(15.42)
(4) + 2000 Demo	-8.68	-15.90	-4.90	29.47	-2.87	-23.74	-0.17	26.63
Controls	(8.82)	(13.77)	(11.98)	(15.85)	(10.35)	(15.68)	(12.19)	(15.55)
(5) + 1992/1996	-8.43	-15.64	-5.83	29.88	-2.52	-23.05	-1.38	26.84
Election Controls	(8.79)	(13.92)	(12.17)	(15.89)	(10.27)	(15.91)	(12.35)	(15.61)

Notes: N=3772 county-district cells. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in Table 3: Industry and occupation controls in row 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations. Census division dummies in row 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demographic controls in row 4 comprise the percentage of a county's population in nine age and four racial groups, as well as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. Election controls in row 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, measured at the county level. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts.

B. Trade Exposure and Outcomes by Period

Tables below provide the period-specific coefficient estimates that are plotted in Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, and Appendix Figures S4, A1, S5.

Table S7: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, November 2004 to November 2008/2012/2016. Dependent Variables: Nielsen TV Rating or Nielsen Market Share (in % pts)

	2004-2008	2004-2012	2004-2016
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	A. Combined Ratings of TV News Networks		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-0.01	0.03	0.42
[t>2007]	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.79)
	B. Market Share FOX News		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	8.83	10.48	10.53
[t>2007]	(4.28)	(5.30)	(3.91)
	C. Market Share CNN		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-2.55	-4.20	-3.89
[t>2007]	(4.57)	(3.36)	(3.54)
	D. Market Share MSNBC		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-6.28	-6.28	-6.65
[t>2007]	(4.30)	(3.72)	(2.76)

$N = 6,813,\ 6,923,\ 6,890$ CZ-year-age-race cells in columns 1 through 3 respectively. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 6 of Table 2.

Table S8: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002-2004/2016. Dependent Variable: Change in Contributions by Type of Campaign Donor (in log points)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Left-Wing Contributions (1st Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	41.45	43.61	73.31	71.00	72.40	108.89	111.76
	(23.83)	(23.56)	(25.43)	(31.06)	(31.49)	(41.00)	(43.08)
	B. Moderate Contributions (2nd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-3.08	3.05	18.56	23.60	23.97	13.79	13.13
	(11.79)	(13.97)	(15.24)	(19.63)	(19.58)	(33.97)	(36.72)
	C. Right-Wing Contributions (3rd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	17.88	12.18	57.65	46.05	47.12	-6.18	52.59
	(23.31)	(25.19)	(25.08)	(27.15)	(27.59)	(30.65)	(37.86)

Notes: $N = 3,772$ county-district cells. Panels A through C indicate the over-time change in contributions from donors whose CF score falls into the first, second, and third tercile of the dollar-weighted distribution of donor ideology in 2002. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S9: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2004/2016. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability and Change in Republican Two-Party Vote Share (in % pts)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Change in Republican Win Probability						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-0.27	-3.96	-2.54	24.08	24.08	26.05	27.07
	(5.07)	(7.12)	(8.13)	(12.07)	(12.07)	(12.19)	(12.37)
	B. Change in Republican Vote Share						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.85	-1.41	-5.35	-1.08	-1.05	-2.94	-6.39
	(4.22)	(5.45)	(6.23)	(5.98)	(5.98)	(7.27)	(6.31)

Notes: $N = 3772$ county-district cells. The dependent variable is the over-time change in probability of a Republican candidate winning the election (panel A) and the change in the Republican share of the two-party vote (panel B), both measured in percentage points. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S10: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2004/16. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				A. Liberal Democrats			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	3.72	-0.53	5.75	-8.43	-7.91	-1.12	-2.52
	(5.96)	(7.94)	(9.66)	(8.79)	(8.78)	(10.68)	(10.27)
				B. Moderate Democrats			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-3.45	4.49	-3.21	-15.64	-16.16	-25.34	-23.05
	(7.74)	(8.60)	(10.17)	(13.92)	(13.95)	(16.04)	(15.91)
				C. Moderate Republicans			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-4.55	-6.70	-10.55	-5.83	-5.83	-6.22	-1.38
	(6.99)	(9.01)	(10.79)	(12.17)	(12.17)	(13.01)	(12.35)
				D. Conservative Republicans			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.29	2.74	8.01	29.88	29.88	28.82	26.84
	(8.26)	(9.38)	(12.42)	(15.89)	(15.89)	(14.96)	(15.61)

Notes: $N = 3,772$ county-district cells. Panels indicate the over-time change in ideology of election winners by party and ideology for liberal Democrats, moderate Democrats, moderate Republicans, and conservative Republicans. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S11: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	I. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Liberal Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.82	2.07	11.98	-11.34	-10.45	-8.91	-10.17
	(6.83)	(8.96)	(10.51)	(9.51)	(9.45)	(10.87)	(10.22)
	B. Moderate Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-4.62	3.21	-9.24	-17.44	-18.33	-22.28	-19.11
	(8.72)	(9.59)	(11.74)	(16.50)	(16.55)	(18.49)	(18.08)
	C. Moderate Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-4.90	-5.78	-11.48	-6.09	-6.09	-7.48	-0.78
	(7.89)	(10.15)	(12.34)	(14.48)	(14.48)	(15.27)	(14.68)
	D. Conservative Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.70	0.49	8.74	34.91	34.91	34.28	30.15
	(9.33)	(10.78)	(14.61)	(19.14)	(19.14)	(17.74)	(18.75)
	II. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Liberal Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	11.40	-4.86	-29.27	30.12	30.12	59.90	43.89
	(15.90)	(15.80)	(18.64)	(17.71)	(17.71)	(19.47)	(16.00)
	B. Moderate Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-13.67	-2.24	-4.91	-29.67	-29.67	-59.00	-42.98
	(16.72)	(15.34)	(17.06)	(14.51)	(14.51)	(14.54)	(13.24)
	C. Moderate Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-5.59	4.33	4.12	8.19	8.19	0.40	-1.28
	(5.02)	(3.91)	(4.10)	(8.77)	(8.77)	(6.96)	(7.25)
	D. Conservative Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	7.86	2.77	30.06	-8.64	-8.64	-6.09	-4.41
	(5.17)	(6.73)	(18.05)	(8.50)	(8.50)	(10.24)	(9.64)

Notes: $N = 3,491$, $N = 276$ county-district cells in Panels I, II. Panels indicate the over-time change in ideology of election winners by party and ideology for liberal Democrats, moderate Democrats, moderate Republicans, and conservative Republicans, for counties that were majority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel I) and those that were minority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel II). All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S12: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002-2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition. Dependent Variable: Change in Contributions by Type of Campaign Donor (in log points)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	I. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Left-Wing Contributions (1st Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	47.51	49.75	77.41	69.63	71.53	91.48	102.59
	(27.24)	(26.18)	(26.52)	(32.96)	(33.56)	(43.54)	(46.63)
	B. Moderate Contributions (2nd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-2.30	-0.22	20.99	22.38	23.26	-0.45	11.77
	(13.46)	(16.09)	(16.81)	(22.57)	(22.52)	(37.88)	(41.33)
	C. Right-Wing Contributions (3rd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	34.16	25.38	70.40	52.98	55.59	-14.54	55.88
	(25.41)	(27.88)	(27.73)	(30.63)	(31.06)	(33.90)	(42.59)
	II. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Left-Wing Contributions (1st Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-15.27	75.40	99.38	116.79	117.93	165.99	151.70
	(21.99)	(33.65)	(39.28)	(50.56)	(50.56)	(53.19)	(57.81)
	B. Moderate Contributions (2nd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-10.51	79.10	63.37	54.40	53.84	73.75	21.53
	(19.02)	(26.16)	(31.13)	(23.59)	(23.31)	(36.59)	(42.27)
	C. Right-Wing Contributions (3rd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-75.25	12.22	74.09	31.80	30.54	47.01	33.96
	(44.96)	(49.17)	(58.38)	(44.97)	(44.77)	(53.43)	(67.47)

Notes: $N = 3,491$, $N = 276$ county-district cells in Panels I, II. Panels indicate the over-time change in ideology of election winners by party and ideology for liberal Democrats, moderate Democrats, moderate Republicans, and conservative Republicans, for counties that were majority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel I) and those that were minority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel II). All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S13: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability (in % pts)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-0.20	-5.29	-2.73	28.78	28.78	30.98	31.23
	(5.95)	(8.14)	(9.21)	(14.65)	(14.65)	(14.90)	(15.09)
	B. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	2.27	7.10	34.18	-0.45	-0.45	-5.69	-5.69
	(3.45)	(4.37)	(17.32)	(9.17)	(9.17)	(10.97)	(10.97)

Notes: $N = 3,491$, $N = 276$ county-district cells in Panels A, B. Panels indicate the over-time change in probability of a Republican candidate winning the election. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

C. Trade Exposure and Changes in Political Beliefs

Using the Pew data presented in Section 7, we explore how rising trade exposure affects expressed political beliefs. We include surveys in 2004, 2011, 2014, and 2015, where we treat the latter three years as a single time period to maximize sample size. Our local labor market approach puts high demands on the data as we observe only 25 observations on average per CZ.[60] Having this caveat in mind, we proceed with an analysis that follows the structure of (4) by estimating an equation of the form:

$$Y_{ijt} = \gamma_j + \gamma_1 \Delta IP^{cu}_{j\tau} \times 1[t = t_2] + Z'_{ijt}\left(\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 \times 1[t = t_2]\right) + X'_{jt_1}\gamma_6 \times 1[t = t_2] + \epsilon_{ijt}, \qquad (7)$$

where the dependent variable Y_{ijt} is the Pew ideology score (on a scale of -10 to $+10$, from more liberal to more conservative) for survey participant i who resided in CZ j and who was interviewed in survey year t, with $t_1 = 2004$ and $t_2 = \{2011,\ 2014,\ 2015\}$; γ_j is a fixed effect for CZ j; and $1[t = t_2]$ is a dummy variable for the second time period. The main variable of interest is the change in import exposure $\Delta IP_{j\tau}$ in CZ j over 2002 to 2010, for which we instrument using (2). The control variables include Z_{ijt}, a vector of characteristics corresponding to participant ijt (a quadratic in age and dummy variables for gender, race, and three categories of education); and X_{jt_1}, the set of regional dummies and initial conditions used in equation (4). As in (4), we include CZ main effects and time-varying coefficients in equation (7) to examine whether average political beliefs change systematically over time within CZs as a function of CZ trade exposure.

Results for the Pew sample data appear in Table S14. In Column 1 of Table S14, which presents a parsimonious 2SLS regression, the coefficient on the interaction between the CZ trade shock

[60] The pooled sample of 20,914 participants includes 667 commuting zones that appear in at least one of the years and 419 commuting zones that appear both in both time periods (i.e., 2004 and at least one of 2011, 2014 or 2015).

and the second-period dummy is positive but small and not precisely estimated ($t = 1.41$). The coefficient magnitude increases substantially in value and becomes more precisely estimated when adding controls for initial economic conditions in column 2 ($t = 1.85$) and political conditions in column 3 ($t = 2.30$). The addition of full controls in column 5—for the Census region and interactions between individual demographic characteristics and the second-period dummy—reduces the trade-shock coefficient somewhat and leaves it marginally significant ($t = 1.69$).

These results suggest that demographically comparable survey respondents residing in commuting zones that were subject to larger increases in Chinese import competition in the 2000s became more likely to express conservative political beliefs over the course of a decade. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate in column 5 indicates that if we compare CZs at the 75th and 25th percentiles of trade exposure, the Pew ideology score would be predicted to increase by 0.65 points (1.30×0.49) between 2004 and 2011/14/2015, or one more right-leaning answer for every three survey respondents, in a CZ at the 75th versus the 25th percentile of trade exposure.[61]

Table S1 further suggests that the rightward shift in political beliefs over the 2000s was stronger among non-Hispanic whites than among other racial and ethnic groups. In the final columns of Table S14, we show results in which we estimate separate trade-shock coefficients for non-Hispanic-white participants versus Hispanic or non-white participants. Whereas the interaction between trade exposure and the second-period dummy is positive and precisely estimated for whites ($t = 2.41$ for partial controls in column 6; $t = 1.93$ for full controls in column 7), for racial and ethnic minorities it ranges from negative to positive and is imprecisely estimated in each case.

These estimates suggest that trade shocks may have engendered rightward shifts among voters, with stronger rightward shifts among whites than among non-whites. Because these models are estimated on a relatively small number of Pew survey observations covering a large number of CZs observed over two time periods, however, they offer insufficient precision to warrant stronger conclusions.

[61] With the interquartile range of import exposure equal to 0.49, an increase in the ideology score of 0.65 corresponds to one in every three respondents changing an answer from the left-leaning to the right-leaning position.

Table S14: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Pew Ideology Scores, 2004 – 2011/14/15. Dependent Variable: Change in Pew Ideology Score

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2010]	0.41	1.31	1.65	1.35	1.32		
	(0.27)	(0.68)	(0.71)	(0.78)	(0.77)		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2010]						0.58	1.35
x Non-Hispanic White						(0.24)	(0.70)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2010]						-0.36	0.91
x Hispanic or Black						(0.33)	(0.75)
Wald Test Equal Coefficients						p<0.01	p<0.14
Estimation Method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage	40.8	35.2	34.8	26.4	26.8	39.0	28.9
CZ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
CZ Industry/Occ x [t>2010]		yes	yes	yes	yes		yes
Pres. Election Ctrls x [t>2010]			yes	yes	yes		yes
Census Divisions x [t>2010]				yes	yes		yes
Demographic Controls x [t>2010]					yes		yes

Notes: $N = 20,914$ in columns 1-5, $N = 19,556$ in columns 6-7. The Pew Ideology Score has a minimum of -10 (most liberal) and maximum of +10 (most conservative). Controls for individual demographics include a quadratic in age and indicators for sex, three race/ethnicity groups (non-Hispanic whites, Hispanics, all others), and three education groups (college, some college, high school and less). Industry and occupation controls in column 2 include the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations, all of which are measured in 2000 and interacted with the dummy for the 2011/14/15 period. Election controls in column 3 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, measured at the county level and interacted with the period dummy. Census division dummies interacted with the period dummy in column 4 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demography interactions in column 5 interact the demographic control variables with the dummy for the 2011/14/15 period. Models in columns 6 and 7 retain only individuals who are white, Hispanic or black. Observations are weighted by each individual's share in the sum of Pew survey weights of a given year, and standard errors are clustered on CZs.